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This paper was stimulated by a remark of Frederic M. Scherer on the
notion "that a nation should weigh its own costs against the costs of its
enemy" in choosing a strategy or in allocating resources to defense. He
said the logic of it escaped him. I doubted that it did, and began to
develop a complacent defense of the proposition only to discover that
indeed the logic—or at least an important part of the logic—had es-
caped me too; and where first I thought that economists like Scherer
and me should neither disagree nor be in doubt about the proper formu-
lation of so simple a principle, I no longer find the principle so simple.
Scherer argued that the proposition is valid only if the amount of
resources a rival can allocate to defense is fixed—"an assumption un-
supported by recent history," he says—or if an arms race is being
waged as a "game of economic ruin." He doubts the advisability of the
latter strategy, at least for the United States against the Soviet Union,
and he goes on to criticize a good deal of recent defense analysis for its
"zero-sum" orientation, its assumption of strictly opposing interests.'
The proposition that the enemy's costs in meeting some threat that
we pose, or in responding to some measure we take, should be taken
into account in deciding whether the measure is worthwhile, is not hard
to defend in a zero-sum context; and one can set Scherer straight by
saying that the zero-sum context is all anyone had in mind. But though
one can defend the letter of the proposition, it is not so easy to defend
the spirit. Should we confine ourselves to the zero-sum context, where
the answers are comparatively easy, evading the more interesting contexts
where the answers may be harder? Should we defend the cost criterion
1Seehis review of E. S. Quade, "Analysis for Military Decisions," American
Economic Review, December 1965, pp. 1191—1192.106 Strategy and Resource Allocation
in a way that increases our vulnerability to Scherer's charge that quanti-
tative military analysis too readily assumes a zero-sum relation, even
while our discussions of strategy are almost exclusively nonzero-sum?
We cannot justify zero-sum reasoning by assuming that the amount
of resources an adversary will put into the contest is fixed. Even with a
fixed budget the contest will almost surely be dramatically nonzero-sum.
"Deterrence," for example, is meaningless in a zero-sum context. So is
"surrender"; so are most limited-war strategies; and so are notions
like "accidental war," escalation, preemptive war, and "brinkmanship."
And of course so are nearly all alliance relationships, arms-race phe-
nomena, and arms control. The fact that war hurts—that not all the
losses of war are recoverable—makes war itself a dramatically nonzero-
sum activity whether budgets are rigidly fixed or not.
To get a zero-sum contest one needs a much more restrictive assump-
tion than the one Scherer mentioned. The idea that we have some
interest in an adversary's domestic economy and that that interest is not
simply opposite to his interest and measurable in the same currency as
our military interests, is only one among many reasons—and surely not
the most important reason—why military relations are nonzero-sum
both in peace and in war. Furthermore, a "game of economic ruin" is
not zero-sum if war itself is an alternative to progressive economic ruin,
and if war is worse than economic ruin, or the threat of such ruin can
be used to extort concessions.
In fact, it is hard to see how military relations can ever even approxi-
mate a zero-sum model unless things have reached the point where all
but two extremes among the possible outcomes have become—for reasons
of diplomacy, personality, technology and geography, or some profound
incompatability between the two sides—practically unattainable and
irrelevant to decision. There are, of course, tactical arenas within a
nonzero-sum relation that can be dealt with, at least in a practical sense,
as separable zero-sum local contests, but care is needed even at the
tactical level.
Separable Zero-Sum Components
There are indeed zero-sum military problems that can be separately
analyzed. Cryptography is an example: one scrambles or enciphers tacti-
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larities is another: one tries not to be predictably unprepared on Sun-
day mornings. One randomizes the firing of hardened missiles so that
they will not be simultaneously and predictably vulnerable during the
moment the lids are off the silos before the missiles are on their way.
Search and evasion will be randomized; depth and proximity fuses will
be set on zero-sum principles; and scarce ammunition may be allocated
among sites on strictly zero-sum criteria. These schedules and allocations
relate usually to some fixed set of resources in circumstances where
thereis no thought of influencing enemy intention, even though
the wider context may be a nonzero-sum campaign or bargaining process.
There is another way that a zero-sum situation can be embedded in
a larger nonzero-sum context and yet be susceptible of isolated zero-
sum analysis. This is if the payoffs are some kind of bargaining power,
usable in some subsequent process of negotiation or coercion. A zero-
sum contest can be fought to determine which side gets some advantage
—some ammunition, some intelligence, some technology, or some part
of the world that is significant for its later strategic role in some con-
frontation or bargain. It will be hard to classify such a contest as "zero-
sum," though, if the two adversaries have different evaluations of the
subsequent bargaining process. It will also be hard to classify it zero-
sum if they can anticipate the later bargaining and make later behavior
conditional on the conduct of the momentary contest. But if the thing
fought over is uniquely recognizable as an advantage to the side that
gets it and if any nonzero-sum use of the asset comes only later, the
momentary contest can be treated as zero-sum.
There is a special case worth mentioning, though it is difficult to give
it a contemporary interpretation. That is the case in which both sides
agree to a "trial by ordeal"—to play a game of chess for the treasure,
or to hold a tournament for a lady's favor. An agreement may be
reached to avoid a potentially destructive nonzero-sum contest by letting
some game (in the literal sense) determine the outcome. David and
Goliath fought, according to Yadin, to make unnecessary a bloody
battle between their armies; both sides agreed (though in the end
Goliath's did not keep the agreement) to let the battle of champions
determine which army would become slaves to the other.2 Arbitration
has this character; a zero-sum battle of wits determines the outcome,
2YigaelYadin, The Art of Warfare in Biblical Lands, New York, 1963, Vol. II,
pp. 267—269.108 Strategy and Resource Allocation
both sides being committed to abide by the result to avoid the poten-
tially more destructive bargaining that would ensue if they were un-
able to wager their positions on some conventional procedure.
Tactics: Zero- or Nonzero-Sum
It is often alleged that strategy is nonzero-sum while tactics tend to be
zero-sum. There is a good deal to the notion; it often means merely
that a mission, once ordered accomplished, should be accomplished
efficiently. Bombing the civilian population of Japan was not a zero-
sum strategy; but once it had been decided to light fires in Tokyo there
was every reason to do it with a minimum of risk and effort, and each
individual sortie could be scheduled from a zero-sum point of view.
On the other hand, a decision to take prisoners, to bomb civilians in
order to destroy a military installation, or to suffer casualties in achiev-
ing an objective, are not zero-sum decisions. Furthermore, even though
back at headquarters a particular engagement may be viewed as zero-
sum, any operation carried out by live human beings is a multiperson,
nonzero-sum game. Maybe some kinds of combat have become so
mechanized that the individual combatant's valuation of his own life
has little relevance to his choice; but the history of warfare tells us
that tactical engagements have always been multiperson, nonzero-sum
games in which fear disabled more combatants than weapons, and
discipline counted more than numbers, weapons, terrain, or technology.
General orders to his Panzer units to open fire before they
were in range, because enemy soldiers ducking their heads were as
good as enemy soldiers dead, was a recognition of the nonzero-sum
character of local combat.
Costs and "Suboptimization"
Still, the zero-sum contest is an interesting bench mark, a limiting case
worth being acquainted with, and often a decent approximation in
some localized arena of the larger contest. So it is worth while to get
the cost principles straight for that situation, too. The principle says
merely that, in taking account of the consequences of some act or deci-
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to our side, just as the costs we incur in carrying out the act, or in
consequence of the decision, must be valued negatively. And a corollary
of this principle is that if substantial costs have to be incurred by the
enemy, and more modest costs incurred by us, and if as a result of in-
curring those costs the enemy keeps us from accomplishing anything
locally, nevertheless his higher costs are a perfectly valid objective, or
motive, for our going ahead with the action. We can even think of the
local contest as a battle of costs.
Now, if the whole situation is strictly zero-sum, and if our analysis is
intended to comprise the whole situation—if we are engaged in what
Charles Hitch has called "grand optimization"—there is no need to
bring in the concept of "cost," whether the enemy's costs or our own.
The best over-all strategy, worked out in all its detail, is just the best
strategy, all things considered; and any relevant costs have already been
implicitly taken into account. The fact that a particular measure on our
part will "cost" an adversary some lives, ammunition, fuel, man-hours or
anything else is of no concern if we have made allowance in our over-all
model for the withdrawal of lives, fuel, man-hours, and so forth, from
their alternative uses. Costs are intended to reflect the payoffs left out
of our local analysis.
It is when we engage in "suboptimization," and the local contest for
which we are suboptimizing uses resources that might have been allo-
cated instead to other arenas, or resources that can be saved and used
later in different arenas, that we need to make specific allowance for
costs. If some particular measure is under consideration and we have
allowed for all of its local tactical consequences but find that it either
uses or saves some resources on our side, and that the adversary's
accommodation increases or decreases some inputs on his side, the local
payoffs do not tell the whole story. The extra resources are withdrawn
from other fields of battle, resources saved are available to other fields
of battle; it is all the same war, and we have to take account of what
happens on those other fields. Costs are simply the measure of conse-
quences, or payoffs, that occur outside the boundari1es of our local prob-
lem. They are the external economies that any partial or local analysis
needs to take into account. If there is no economic linkage between our
local problem and the rest of the whole problem—if all local re-
sources are specific, if nothing can be added or withdrawn, if nothing
can be saved for later use—then the local payoffs tell the whole story,110 Strategyand Resource Allocation
and we need make no allowance, through "costs," for payoffs beyond
our horizon.
Of course, if all resources are so specific that to find out the "worth"
of resources added or withdrawn elsewhere we have to examine in detail
their impact on those other fields of battle, then we have to solve all the
problems at once in order to solve our local problem, and suboptimiza-
tion is infeasible. Suboptimization only works if there is little or no con-
nection between the local problem and the over-all problem, or if there
is some convenient approximate way of making allowance for the im-
pingement of the local problem on the bigger problem. If the enemy
has an actual price system that works rationally, or if he manages
nevertheless by direct means to allocate his resources efficiently; and if
the enemy's economy is characterized by substitution possibilities, alter-
native uses of outputs, and all the other characteristics we usually im-
pute to a resilient and rational economy; and particularly if the situa-
tion allows the enemy time to adapt economically to the measures we
confront him with; then we assume that increments of enemy resources
can be allowed for as "costs" and "savings" without regard to how the
individual items that comprise the resources are allocated elsewhere, or
precisely where they are drawn from.
That seems to be all. It could be illustrated by a set of a dozen zero-sum
matrices, each dependent on the share of total resources allocated to it,
the payoffs to each side being the sum of the payoffs in the individual
matrices, with "optimization" achieved only when neither side could
improve its position by reallocating resources among the different arenas.
A shift in the parameters of one matrix might open opportunities for
one side to improve its position by shifting resources into that matrix; if
they are shifted from the other eleven matrices in a way that minimizes
the reduction of payoffs in those other matrices, there is a calculable
"cost" that is of interest to both sides. This "cost" will tend to be the
same (for modest increments) whichever the matrix to which resources
are being added, and it permits measurement of the impact of local
decisions on other fields of battle. If we combine the twelve matrices
into a single game we can drop the cost concept altogether; if instead
itis convenient to analyze the twelve different subgames separately,
the "cost" figures serve an essential purpose and make local optimiza-
tion consistent with over-all optimization.
The principle does not depend on there being a recognized live, ra-The Strategy of Inflicting Costs 111
tional zero-sum adversary. The traditional examples of external econ-
omies reflect the same principle. If decisions are decentralized to the
managers of twelve fields belonging to the same farm, any managers who
put up scarecrows, or plant extra seed, or protect the seeds so that it
takes crows longer to get at them, will affect the number of crows on
each other's fields. These "adaptive" shifts of the "enemy" have to be
taken into account in deciding whether the scarecrow, or the extra seed
that draw crows from neighboring fields, is worth the cost.
Costs can of course be used incorrectly, and most of the exposures of
the "fallacy" of this cost reasoning relate to some mistaken use. I have
been asked whether I would buy a one-hundred-dollar nylon vest to
protect myself from a five-cent bullet, as though the cost criterion says
I should not—the factor of 2000-to-i against me making it a bad
investment—yet if I treasure my life I shall obviously buy the vest. In
this example the cost criterion is merely backwards; the relevant ques-
tion is whether my adversary should buy a bullet knowing that I can
nullify his investment with a bullet-proof vest. He has wasted his
money if the vest is cheap, made a splendid investment if my vest is
expensive, and if asked what he accomplished by buying his bullet
should have the good sense to say that he imposed a cost on me, not
that he hoped to kill me and was frustrated.
The "Exchange Rate"
We need of course some kind of "exchange rate" to tell, without extend-
ing our analysis into grand optimization, whether a cost imposed on the
enemy is worth the cost to us of imposing it. Unless we and our adver-
sary have comparable economies there is no reason why the appro-
priate exchange rate should equate percentages of gross national product
or any other economic magnitudes on the two sides. We can say, as a
kind of shorthand, that a cost is worth incurring if it imposes a "greater"
cost on the other side; but then we must mean that "costs" have already
been measured in the same currency as the payoffs in those other
arenas. If we calculate "costs" for the two sides in any other way, such
as money costs converted on a foreign currency market, percentages of
GNP, or what the enemy's specific inputs would cost at our prices,
there is no reason to suppose that a straightforward comparison of
"greater" and "smaller" will tell us the story.112 Strategy and Resource Allocation
The incidence of Costs on Consumers
Suppose an enemy fuel shortage falls on consumers and the enemy
values the health and comfort of his people, deplores the death of in-
fants, suffers in the suffering of his people, and takes those civilian
values into account in his own planning, not for the military advantage
they give him but just for their own sake. Then the relation between
us is nonzero-sum. We may like his babies to be warm and healthy,
prefer that they suffer, or not give a thought to it; but we are unlikely to
be just as disposed to welcome the suffering of his people as he is to de-
plore it. In our cost calculations we should take no credit for the pros-
pect that some children will be cold or sick because we damaged enemy
fuel supplies.
In fact, the enemy may care less about his own people than we do—if
by "enemy" we mean the directorate of the military opposition to us.
Suppose the enemy neither likes nor dislikes his subjects—perhaps be-
cause he is a military occupant of another country and does not much
care whether the citizenry suffers or prospers—and we do not care
either, because our sole concern is military advantage. The game is still
zero-sum, but if a local fuel shortage falls on the local citizens who
will have less heat in their houses, or if a local fuel saving means
merely that less is requisitioned locally, there is no "cost" to be allowed
for in our problem. The cost is passed along to somebody outside the
contest. The costs we want in our analysis are those that reflect the flow
of resources among the sectors of the contest, for all the sectors com-
prising the adversary relation between us; if other sectors are involved
and can absorb or yield resources to the sectors engaged in the contest,
then either those sectors matter and the situation is nonzero-sum, or they
do not matter themselves and distort the price system. We have to cor-
rect for them. That makes it harder to ascertain the costs and to use the
figures properly, but does not contradict the principle.
The Nonzero-Sum Context
Let me turn now to the nonzero-sum adversary relation that usually
characterizes war and military preparations. First let us remind our-The Strategy of Inflicting Costs 113
selves of some of the reasons why wars and arms races are nonzero-
sum. Thereiscivilian damage—pain,disability,death,privation,
lowered living standards, fear and anxiety, both during the war itself
and after the war. There are battle casualties; soldiers are people, and
when they die there is not only a loss of military assets but also human
pain and grief. There is, during military buildup, some influence of that
buildup on the likelihood that war will occur; and military preparations
affect the character of any war that ensues, including the capabilities of
both sides for keeping it limited and for stopping it. Wars and military
preparations affect precedents (like the use of gas or nuclear weapons)
that affect the conduct of future war. The enemy in a war is often a
potential ally or subject. (In colonial wars, the killing of an enemy
soldier is the loss of a colonial subject.) War involves hostages; much of
the population of western Europe was a potential hostage in German
hands during World War II. Adversaries can furthermore gain or lose
honor and prestige in a nonzero-sum fashion. War can induce political
change; the monarchs of 1914 destroyed most of the system congenial to
them. War can weaken both adversaries vis-à-vis other countries. There
is a moral cost for some countries in the conduct of war. War is often a
multiperson relationship; the generals' plot against Hitler's life and the
shift in authority within Japan after Hiroshima remind us that nations
are not the same as individuals or teams of like-minded individuals.
Finally there is the point mentioned by Scherer, that the military ex-
penditure of potential adversaries can affect the civilian welfare and
political conduct of the country, affecting the likelihood of war itself.
We could go on, but there is no need to. Zero-sum adversary relation-
ships are hard to find in any important area of human affairs; and
people in need of an example in a hurry sometimes point to war as one
of the rare zero-sum social relationships, but this is pure thoughtlessness.
About the only thing that could make war appear zero-sum would be a
belief that war were zero-sum, a belief so obstinately held that the war
would indeed be conducted that way. People who put chessmen on the
dust jackets of books about strategy are presumably thinking of the
intellectual structure of the game, not its payoff structure; and one
hopes that itis chess they do not understand, not war, in supposing
that a zero-sum parlor game catches the spirit of a nonzero-sum diplo-
matic phenomenon.114 Strategyand Resource Allocation
Elasticities of Demand: A Comparative-Advantage Example
Because Scherer and others have already pointed out that costs imposed
on the enemy may be passed along to his population, so that we gain
less than we hoped or even lose if we prefer his civilians not to bear the
cost, let me suppose a fixed enemy military budget and explore some of
the ways the cost criterion gets complicated as we acknowledge that our
interests and our opponent's are not strictly opposed. Consider that he
has a given budget that he can allocate among two, or three, or more
kinds of military resources for a war with us. We have to examine how
our deployment of forces affects his deployment, and in what ways our
choices can influence his choices and how we should evaluate his
choices.
Begin with a simple model. He has a budget with which to buy
missiles and sites. If he spends it mostly on missiles and concentrates on
a small number of sites he gets more missiles than if he went to the
added expense of dispersing his missiles among more At the same
time, his missiles are more vulnerable if they are concentrated; and for
"second-strike" purposes he prefers a dispersed force. His value system,
we may suppose, contains two variables: the number of missiles that he
can buy (with which he could launch an attack), and the number of
missiles he could expect to have (or can threaten to have) left over in
case we attack him. We can call these his "first-strike" force and his
"second-strike" force. (They are of course the same force, but they are
evaluated differently according to who starts the war. A large vulner-
able force has a comparative advantage in striking first; a smaller less
vulnerable force has a comparative advantage in striking back.)
How he disperses his missile force—how he uses money that might
have been spent on missiles to buy more sites—will depend on how
expensive the sites are. If sites are cheap he will buy a site for each
missile (perhaps more, if we cannot tell empty sites from those that
have missiles and must target as many sites as he buys). If sites are
expensive he cannot much disperse his force without greatly reducing
its size; beyond some point, even for a purely second-strike force, more
dispersal becomes uneconomical.
To be explicit, suppose that his costs are a linear function of missiles
and sites; missiles are procured at a constant price, sites are procured atThe Strategy of Inflicting Costs 115
aconstant price. We have a given force with which we can attack all of
his sites; and, not knowing the particular distribution of missiles among
those sites, we would distribute our attacking missiles evenly if we
attacked. Suppose our attacking missiles have independent probabilities
of kill, so that the survival of a site is merely the survival probability in
the face of one attacking missile, compounded by the number of
missiles fired at the site. Let X denote the number of missiles he buys,
Y the number of sites, and M the size of our attacking force, with P
the survival probability of an individual site under attack by a single
missile, K his total budget (measured in units equal to the price of a
missile), and a the price ratio of sites to missiles. The expected number
of missiles surviving our attack would be equal to:
Substituting the budget equation, this gives:
[K —aY]PMII'
If he wants to maximize the expected value of his second-strike force,
he merely maximizes that expression with respect to Y. If he wants to
maximize some function of first- and second-strike forces, giving positive
value to his first-strike force, we have to specify the function but then
we can go ahead and solve his problem.
Now let me pose this question. Suppose we invent a new device,
perhaps a new ingredient in the warhead of our attacking missiles, that
if unanticipated by the enemy would increase the potency of each of our
missiles against any site it is aimed at. It makes all of his sites more
vulnerable, and hence his entire missile force. Never mind what it ac-
tually is; just imagine that it is available to us at modest cost. Suppose
the enemy knows about it and can either see that we have it or assume
that we have it. And suppose that this particular capability is one that is
readily countered, but at a price. The enemy can defend himself against
this measure with complete effectiveness but has to spend money to do
so. Do we hope his countermeasure is cheap or expensive?
Now, the distinguishing characteristic of this particular measure is
that it attacks sites, not missiles. Of course, ifit destroys a siteit
destroys the missiles on the site; that is the whole idea. The point is this:
The enemy's countermeasure is associated with his sites, not with his
missiles, so that the aggregate cost of defending his force against our116 Strategyand Resource Allocation
new device depends on how many sites he has to protect, not on how
many missiles he has to protect. His countermeasure, we suppose, is
adding smoke screens, antiaircraft batteries, police dogs, duplicate gene-
rators, or some other active or passive defense to individual sites in such
a way that the cost does not depend on how many missiles are on the
site.
The point of this distinction, of course, is that it affects his allocation
of resources between missiles and sites. That is, it affects the allocation
of his budget between first- and second-strike forces. And we care.
Furthermore, we care in a way that is not strictly opposed to the way
he cares.
He may, for example, be mainly concerned to deter us with the best
second-strike force he can buy and have little interest in either attacking
us with his whole force or threatening to attack with his whole force.
(He could even prefer to reduce our apprehension, and attach negative
value to his first-strike force.) And we may prefer that he buy a second-
strike rather than a first-strike force, that is, a force whose second-strike
capability is relatively larger and whose first-strike capability relatively
smaller.
We may not. It depends on whether we want to deter him or to
attack him, and it depends on what we think raises or lowers the likeli-
hood of our having to attack him or his having to attack us. However,
if we mainly want deterrence, our preferences somewhat coincide with
his. He wants a good second-strike force even at the expense of his
first-strike force; we are willing to see him get a good second-strike
force if it is at the expense of his first-strike force.
Now, do we want the price of his sites, as distinct from the price of
his missiles, to be high or low? If we can raise the price of those sites
by threatening them with a measure against which a costly counter-
measure is available, do we want to make the threat? If he must assume
we have the device, do we want the countermeasure to be expensive or
inexpensive? And would we prefer to threaten him with a measure
whose defense is associated with his missiles rather than his sites, so that
they raise his cost per missile rather than his cost per site?
We can solve the problem explicitly and find out—at least we can
if we specify his preference function as among first- and second-strike
forces, and our preference function as between his first- and second-
strike forces. But offhand about the only conclusion we can jump toThe Strategy of Inflicting Costs 117
isthat we would rather raise the price of his missiles than the price of
his sites(if the aggregate costs in both cases are of about the same
magnitude) because we anticipate that he will use more of the cheaper
of the two inputs, and we know which one it is that we want him to use.
Intuition, analogy, or quick mental arithmetic will not give us that
answer about site costs. If some neutral country sells the site-defense
countermeasure and we can influence its price policy, we do not yet
know whether we want it cheap or expensive.
The key to our decision is what, in the familiar language of eco-
nomics, we might call the enemy's of demand" for missile
sites. Whatever he spends on sites is unavailable to be spent on missiles.
If we want to minimize his first-strike force, we want to minimize the
money he spends on missiles, therefore to maximize the money he
spends on sites. Will he spend more money on sites, or less, if the price
of sites goes up? Is his demand for sites inelastic or elastic? We have to
work the problem to find out.
In the specific form in which I set up the problem above, if the
enemy's exclusive interest is a second-strike force, it turns out that his
demand for sites is slightly He spends somewhat more on
sites if the price of sites goes up, less on missiles. To put it differently,
the "income effect" of the price rise outweighs the "substitution effect"
and, though missiles have become cheaper relative to sites, he now
buys fewer missiles.
In this particular problem the answer happens to be independent of
the initial costs of sites and missiles and independent of the budget; but
this is a special case and we would have to give a more qualified answer
if we worked with a more complicated model—if, for example, missiles
or sites were bought along rising or falling supply curves, if sites sup-
ported or interfered with each other, or if missiles did, or if the enemy's
preference function were slightly different. It is easy to make a minor
change in this model and reach the contrary conclusion—that we do not
want sites to become more expensive to the enemy, we want the counter-
3Xe(M log ismaximized at Y2 + MY log P —(KMlog P)/a =0.Differen-




More directly, one can maximize XPGMI (Kx) and differentiate the resulting equation
for dX/da. That derivative is negative.118 Strategyand Resource Allocation
measure sold cheaply; and we should avoid confronting the enemy with
our own measure in the first place if we can, to keep him from finding
missiles more attractive, relative to sites, than they used to be.4
This kind of consideration cannot arise in the zero-sum confrontation.
It furthermore can arise, as it did here, without regard to whether we
care whether the enemy's people are better housed and fed. It can arise,
as it did here, without our putting a positive value on his second-strike
force. It requires only that our preferences not be strictly opposed to
those of the enemy, or, in economic terms, that our indifference curves
as between his first-strike and his second-strike capabilities not corn-
cide with his in reverse.
A Jointly Valued Capability
Consider another problem, where the answer should no longer sur-
prise us after working through the first problem. Let there be some
military capability that the enemy wants and that we want him to have.
This is something we want him to buy not just because it uses resources
that he would otherwise spend on things that we deplore even more;
this is something it is positively in our interest that he have. We want
him to have it even if it is free of charge, and we might even provide it if
he could not buy it himself. It might be a device to avoid nuclear
accidents, to minimize the false alarms that might cause him to launch
war itself, to reduce nuclear fall-out, to facilitate armistice, to permit the
recovery of dead or wounded from the battlefield, to care for prisoners
of war, to avoid the military destruction of fish and wildlife, or anything
else. The point is, he wants it, and we want him to have it; we have no
military interest in denying it to him, and if it gives him any sort of
local advantage in a zero-sum contest somewhere, that disadvantage
to us is outweighed by its beneficial effects over-all.
Suppose, now, there is some measure available to us with which we
can destroy it. Or suppose we can affect the price he pays for it, causing
it to be more expensive or less expensive. What should we do?
There is a lot to be said for being nice about it, if only to dramatize
4"Elasticityof demand" is strictly applicable only if the price of sites is fixed
to the buyer, who chooses the quantity that maximizes whatever itis that he
wants to maximize. From here on we shall use "elasticity" in a looser sense
just to suggest the idea of a "revenue effect" and what happens to the budget
available for other commodities.The Strategy of Inflicting Costs 119
the common interest, to set a precedent for preserving assets of value to
both sides, to induce him to avoid taking reciprocal measures that
would hurt us as well as himself, and for other essentially diplomatic or
bargaining reasons. Leaving those aside—just considering our influence
on his allocation of resources—we have two interests here. First, we
want him to possess that capability; even if we threaten to destroy it,
we want him to take steps to defend it. Second, we want to divert re-
sources from other capabilities that we do not like into this capability
that we do like, not just because we like this capability but because we
like it to draw resources from the rest of his budget.
Again it is something like elasticity of demand that is relevant. If
we know that he will defend that capability at all costs, because it is
important to him as well as to us, then we can safely threaten it, forcing
him to defend it, knowing that the net effect will be fewer resources
available to the part of his force that we do not like. We threaten—to
pick an extreme example—to spoof his warning system so that he
would launch a successful first-strike against us—a first-strike that,
though successful, he would rather not launch and would launch only
in the mistaken belief that he was under attack. He anticipates our
spoofing and spends money to tranquilize his warning system, to make
sure that we cannot provoke him into an attack that he would prefer
not to launch, to make sure that we do not bring down on ourselves a
war that we deplore as much as he. We watch him cut back his ground
forces, or his first-strike capability against our strategic forces, or his
second-strike capability against our civilian assets, or some other program
that opposes our interests, in order to maintain the capability that,
though we like it too, he likes very much.5
But we must be careful. If we put the price so high that he prefers
to do without it—if we threaten it in a way that makes its defense too
costly for him—we divert no resources from other parts of his budget;
we merely prevent his having something that we both badly want him
to have. Or if the countermeasure is something that be can buy in vary-
ing quantities or degrees, raising the price or supply curve may cause
him to buy less of it. If his "demand" is elastic he ends up with less of
what we want him to have, more of what we do not want him to have,
and we lose on both counts; if his "demand" is inelastic he ends up with
In view of Professor Eisner's later comment, I acknowledge that this is an
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somewhat less of what we want him to have, less also of what we do not
want him to have, and we must weigh the one against the other.
The point of this example is twofold. First: to emphasize that there
are military capabilities that we want the enemy to have—not just that
we dislike less than we dislike other capabilities, considering his mar-
ginal rate of substitution, but that we value positively, which we want
him to have, and would even buy for him if he did not procure it for
himself. Second: that just as we might want to lower the price of a force
that we prefer him not to have, to induce him to draw resources from
other parts of his budget that we like even less, we could want to raise
the price of things we prefer that he have, for the same reason. Here
it is a case of wanting the income effect on the rest of his budget to
outweigh the substitution effect for this particular item.
A Diversionary Threat
Next consider the enemy's response to a new capability on our side to
inflict damage on his civilians and their property. And suppose, just to
clarify the principle, that what we threaten to destroy is of little or no
military value. This could be because he cannot mobilize these civilian
resources before or during war, or because they have low military va'ue
(a strong comparative advantage toward civilian value). Pain and life
itself would have this quality, as would potential members of the labor
force too young to work until the war is over; so would physical assets
that would be more important after the war than during the war, and
structures too specific in their civilian use to be transferable directly or
indirectly into military strength. The idea is simply that, whatever the
value of threatening such destruction, we get no military advantage from
carrying out the destruction. Nor does the enemy suffer a significant
military disadvantage. It is pure civilian loss, a kind of "side payment"
that he makes but we don't get.
Aside from revenge, justice, and other moral and psychological satis-
factions—and these could be negative—there appear to be two main
purposes served by such a military threat directedagainst enemy
civilian value. Both depend on influencing the opponent's behavior.
One is coercion (i.e. bargaining advantage) and the other is diversion
(of resources from other uses). "Coercion" implies that he refrains from
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carry out the destruction or not according to whether he refrains or not.
"Diversion" implies that he anticipates our attack on hiscivilian
value and does something to mitigate the effect. We may or may not
want him to divert resources. If he does,it reduces our remaining
coercive influence. But if we want him to divert resources—if that is
the purpose—the result is brought about by coercion, by the threat that
we will destroy civilian value unless he diverts resources to protect
them. To the extent that he can attenuate our threat by shifting re-
sources, he merely holds us to our bargain by carrying out his part.
Now, how do we feel about the costs to the enemy of countering our
threat in some fashion? This will depend on how he counters it, and at
the expense of what other capability. Two important possibilities are
that he would defend his civilian assets and that he would procure a
force of his own with which to threaten ours. If he defends his people,
it could be at the expense of his battlefield forces—that is, the forces
he could field in a "zero-sum contest" for territory or booty—or it
could be at the expense of the force with which he threatens our
civilian assets. (It could also be at the expense of some measures, of
the kind suggested earlier, to which we attach positive value.) The diver-
sion might also change the character of the forces he threatens us with,
such as their first- or second-strike advantage, and change his expecta-
tion of the likelihood of war.
There are two limiting cases to consider: First, that the damage we
threaten would certainly deter the enemy in all circumstances, so that
we need no longer worry about how he allocates his military resources
(and,if he could acknowledge the adequacy of our deterrence, he
might as well disband his force); second, that though the damage we
could do would severely reduce the net gain to the enemy from any
war he might contemplate, it would certainly not deter him if on other
grounds he had decided to have his war.
If he is certainly deterred, we have no interest in diversion. Our
only interest is that diversion be incapable of spoiling our deterrence.
We want the costs of an adequate defense to be prohibitively high.
If deterrence is clearly inadequate, our interest will be diversion.
We want him to withdraw as much as possible from his other capa-
bilities as the price of defending himself against our threat—at least, we
do unless he withdraws resources from some capabilities that we prefer
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field, or from a first-strike strategic force or from a second-strike force
that does not shift in character toward a first-strike force under the pres-
sure of a smaller budget, we want the price of defense to be low enough
to be attractive, high enough to be costly. Again, "elasticity of demand"
is the analogy, although we are likely to be less interested in the "price"
of a "unit of defense" than in the whole curve relating damage to in-
vestment in defense. If defense is too costly—if itis too ineffective
compared with its cost—the enemy will not invest in it. We get nothing
for our trouble. In fact, anticipating that he will not defend his civilian
assets, we should not procure the threatening force in the first place.
(Paradoxically, the enemy may prefer that his civilian assets be in-
defensible in the face of a threat not large enough to deter him. The
indefensibility of his cities makes our threat purposeless, and we may
not bother to buy it.)
He may instead react by developing a reciprocal civil-damage force
of his own. If he does, we want it to be costly. We may not like this
response, even if it is costly, and prefer not to provoke it. From his point
of view, if he can afford either to defend his cities or to threaten ours
but cannot afford both, defending and threatening may be equally
attractive. From our point of view they are not equally attractive.
These considerations are important. Burton Klein pointed out in his
study of German war economics that one of the main consequences of
the strategic bombing of Germany in World War II was the sizeable
diversion of German resources into air defense—up to one third of all
German military production went into active defense against air attack
at the climax of the war.6 If the purpose was merely to defend military
strength, it was part of a zero-sum contest not related to what I have
been discussing. But if the object was to preserve Germany and Ger-
mans, not just war potential, it was the diversionary principle expressed
above. There is presently a corresponding question whether the United
States should want the Soviet Union to invest, or not to invest, in
ballistic-missile defenses.
Between the extremes of sure deterrence and no deterrence, the deter-
rent and diversionary motives can both be present. We might, for
example, prefer a large Soviet investment in city defenses that, though
inadequate to spoil deterrence altogether, would appear to the Soviet
6 Burton H. Klein, Germany's Economic Preparations for War, Cambridge,
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leaders a useful hedge against war yet would take resources away from
their offensive forces or their battlefield forces. One can hope that the
threat provokes enough expenditure on the defense of civilian assets to
constitute a substantial diversion without the defense being so effective
that it greatly reduces deterrence. How to weigh the two considerations
depends on what it takes to reduce deterrence. One probably has to pay
some price in deterrence in order to achieve the diversion, because the
enemy will not waste money on a futile defense; still, an opponent could
find it worthwhile to spend money to reduce damage in a possible war,
without the extent of such reduction necessarily affecting his willingness
to launch war or to provoke it.If we manage to draw the enemy's
"supply curve" of defense—the relation of damage-reduction to money
spent on it—we want to be careful bow we draw it; anybody who then
shifts it upward may do us as much harm as if he shifted it downward.
Adaptation and Costs
In zero-sum situations, the enemy's adaptation to a new initiative on our
part always reduces the value of that initiative. We see an opportunity
or a new capability, take advantage of it, and get a certain score at his
expense if he does not adapt; his adaptation takes away some of our
advantage. The net advantage to us depends on how costly his adaptation
is; but in zero-sum situations, we always prefer that he be unadapted—
that he not know of our new initiative, find adaptation too costly, or be
institutionally unable to adapt. In nonzero-sum situations we can prefer
that he adapt; and he can prefer to adapt, knowing that we prefer him to.
In fact, we can undertake moves that have no value for us unless he
does adapt. The diversionary principle just discussed is one of these.
Facing an enemy threat to our civilian values, we might be attracted
to a completely defensive posture that virtually nullifies his threat. We
might alternatively be attracted to a completely offensive posture be-
cause it obliges him to dismantle his offensive posture and devote re-
sources to defense.
It is possible that our preferred posture in the face of an enemy
offense is pure defense, but we like even better a pure enemy defense
that is induced by a purely offensive posture on our side, and choose the
offensive posture accordingly. If he does not adapt as we hope, we end
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In this case, unless he adapts as we expect, improving our position as he
rectifies his own, our move is a bad one, for us and perhaps for him.
Adaptive Cost-A voidance: Comparative Advantage Again
Consider one more case, just to sharpen up the contrast between zero-
sum and nonzero-sum calculations. The enemy is building a force, or
about to buy a force, of one hundred "semihardened" missiles at a cost
of $1 apiece. Our attack force can inflict 50 per cent attrition on his
one hundred missiles if we attack. He could alternatively buy hardened
missiles, fully invulnerable, for $2.20 apiece. His goal is a force out of
which fifty missiles could survive attack; and at these prices he gets it for
$100 with the more vulnerable missiles while it would cost $110 if he
bought fifty of the more expensive invulnerable variety. Suddenly we
discover a device that increases the vulnerability of the semihardened
type of missile; with this device, even though it costs us something and
reduces the size of our attack force, the enemy's one hundred-missile
force would be 75 per cent vulnerable and only twenty-five missiles
would survive. What do we get for our money?
If he fails to adapt—if the device is our secret—we get a reduction
by half of his surviving force in the event we attack. If he adapts by
increasing his force of vulnerable missiles, we oblige him to buy twice
as many (to reach an expectation that fifty will survive) and raise his
costs by $100, the resources being detracted from somewhere. But he
has another option: he can switch to the different type of missile and
get a potential force of fifty surviving our attack for a cost of $110. For
the sake of the example, suppose that his procurement is not too far
along to permit the switch; perhaps the one type of missile is converted
into the other by additional expenditure on the missile's environment
of $1.20 per missile.
He switches, gets an estimated fifty surviving attack at a cost of $2.20
each, spending a total of $110, or $10 more than he originally planned.
What did we get for our money—the money we spent on the device
that caused him to switch his missile-procurement plan?
Mainly we got a qualitative change in his force—that is, a quantita-
tive trade along two dimensions—together with a modest drain on his
military resources elsewhere. He would have had a second-strike force
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device, he procures instead a second-strike force of fifty and a first-
strike force of fifty. Besides costing him $10 we have cut his first-strike
force by fifty.
We like it; and we like it quite out of proportion to the $10 cost we
inflicted on him.
In fact, our device may cost us so much that inflicting an extra cost
of $10 would be a poor bargain; but by cutting his first-strike force in
half without firing a shot we may achieve something well worth the
cost.
His cost increase can be a gross understatement of what we gained by
imposing on him the incentive to incur the cost. We tilted his trade-off
line and were the beneficiaries of his shift in procurement. (In the same
way we might have sold him, or given him, something that would have
reduced the cost of the more expensive missile, and been the chief
beneficiary of his savings. In fact, we could have subsidized, with cash,
his procurement of the more expensive missile, and come out ahead.)
Our gain is of the same algebraic sign as his cost, but bears no particular
proportion to it. We could have had the same result if the hardened
missile cost $2.01 or $3.99, except for the net cost to his other pro-
grams. This net cost is really separable from the reduction in first-strike
force and has to be evaluated altogether separately. At $3.99 we are
more likely to enjoy the result (unless the resources come out of that
fail-safe system we were concerned about earlier), at $2.01 we are less
enthusiastic; but the drain on his resources is separable from the shift
in first-second-strike composition.
Notice this, too. Had he been able to buy an even "softer" missile
that was already 75 per cent vulnerable and unaffected by our new
offensive device, but that cost, say, $0.55 and was not competitive with
the semihardened, our new capability would make the semibardened a
poor buy and his response might be to procure two hundred of the soft
ones for $110. This we do not like; his first-strike force is doubled at a
net cost of $10 and, even if he does not much care, we do. If both the
"hard" and "soft" alternatives are available, minor shifts in the ratio
of cost to survivability can make, from our point of view, major changes
in his force: at $0.53 per soft missile, with hard ones at $2.20, he buys
two hundred soft ones for $106 while at $0.57 per soft missile he buys
fifty hard ones for $110. To him, if second-strike ability is what he
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I am not now trying to illustrate, once again, that we may like or dis-
like what our initiative made him do, but that minor variations in his
relative costs can make major differences in our evaluation of his
response. A consequence of this is that no single measure of his cost
—whether discounted, augmented, or changed in sign from the original
estimate to make it a better measure of what we gain—can be used as a
"correction" of his costs to reach their net worth to us. It is not just that
the gain or loss to us is poorly measured by the cost inflicted on the
opponent and needs to be corrected; it is that the gain or loss to us de-
pends on the particular way that he reacts in a particular case, on the
particular incidence of the new costs within his budget, on the particular
price comparisons that determine his response. Two measures that iden-
tically raise his costs can induce changes in our payoffs that bear no
relation to each other. No "exchange-rate" correction will take care of
this. In the zero-sum case his marginal decisions are marginal to us, and
we can use a single measure of "costs" to avoid tracing the ramifications
of his response. In the nonzero-sum case there is no short cut; the
ramifications have to be traced.
Conclusion About Enemy Costs
What conclusion do we reach about the role of inflicted enemy costs in
evaluating our own alternatives?
The main conclusion is that costs, in a nonzero-sum context, do
not reflect the changes in payoffs outside the arena of our suboptimiza-
tion. The reason is simple: the costs we inflict, or threaten to inflict, on
the enemy can at most reflect the changes in his payoffs outside the
local arena. They do not reflect the relevant changes in our payoffs be-
cause there is not the convenient perfect negative correlation between
his losses and our gains once we drop the zero-sum restriction, that is,
once we extend our analysis into the (almost universal) nonzero-sum con-
texts.
In the zero-sum case his costs reflect the gains to us that our local
analysis would otherwise have left out of account. In the nonzero-sum
case neither the magnitude of his costs, nor even the algebraic sign,
reliably suggests the pertinent changes in our payoffs. Our gains may be
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to what they suggest, and will differ according to the particular choice
we pose for him.
This strikes a blow at "suboptimization," of course. What makes
partial analysis valid is often the dependability of enemy costs as a short
cut to all the ramffications outside the local contest. When costs are
recognized as undependable—when they are no index to magnitude or
even sign, neither an upper nor a lower limit to the effect on us of the
adversary's adaptation, to what happens outside our local field of
vision—we have to extend our field of vision.
And as mentioned above, our attitude toward his adapting to our own
behavior is different; instead of reducing our advantage it can raise it
or offset it in a manner not communicated by his costs. As a corollary,
our attitude toward secrecy and information can be dramatically dif-
ferent from what it is in the zero-sum case, as Martin McGuire has
recently emphasized.7 Taking the first move and letting the adversary
adapt is never the right choice in a zero-sum situation; it often is in the
nonzero-sum.
Secrecyand the Arms Race, Cambridge, Mass., 1965, especially Chapter 7,
pp. 212—232.